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Abstract— While automation of signal and route setting 
is routine, the use of automation or decision support in disruption 
management processes is far less common. Such support offers 
significant advantages in optimising re-planning of both timetable 
and resources (crew and rolling stock), and has value in offering a 
'shared view' of re-planning across the many actors manage 
disruption. If this vision is to be realised, however, disruption 
management decision support and automation must adhere to 
proven principles for effective human-agent cooperation. This 
paper synthesises data from a programme of work to understand 
user requirements for automated disruption support tools. It then 
compares these outputs with two frameworks for human-centred 
automation - one general (Klein et al's [2004] ten challenges for 
automation) and one transport specific (Balfe et al’s [2012] 
principles for transport automation). Emergent design 
requirements include the need for iterative modification of 
rescheduling parameters throughout a disruption, visibility of the 
reasoning behind options, accountability remaining in the hands 
of disruption controllers, and the need for the automated 
disruption support tools to take a multi-dimensional view of 
disruption that varies depending on the event encountered. The 
paper reflects on the practical utility of high-level design 
principles for automated disruption support tools. 
  
Keywords—Disruption, automation, traffic management, 
human factors. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 Delay and disruption on the railways has a financial cost in 
terms of lost patronage and delay attribution penalties [1]. The 
high priority placed by travellers on reliability [2] means delay 
both undermines existing passenger confidence and inhibits 
potential mode shift from the car to the train. Tackling 
disruption is therefore a critical challenge if the railways are to 
offer a viable, sustainable travel option [3]. New solutions to 
minimise disruption could restrict the temporal impact of delay 
(how long the disruption persists) and the geographical spread 
of delay (how widespread are the delays). This would have 
significant benefits for improving capacity. There are a number 
of technical solutions that might be useful for those with 
control or replanning roles (as opposed to, say, drivers) within  
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rail disruption – these include specific tools for (e.g. tools for 
shared views of disruption management plans) or tools that 
support traffic management more generally but maintain their 
robustness in a disruption situation.  
Proposed solutions include traffic re-planning and 
operational decision-making tools [4, 5] complemented by 
support tools for short-term crew and rolling stock re-
planning. Re-planning tools such as predictive, interactive 
train graphs [6], could not only help individual decision 
makers to plan alternatives, but can act as a visual, shared 
representation so that a number of relevant stakeholders can 
see the proposed plan (also see [7]).  Technology also applies 
to passengers and the need to provide accurate information on 
the duration of delays and potential alternatives. This kind of 
information is transmitted through traditional means such as 
station staff, but also through more recent forms of technology 
such as mobile travel applications [8] and social media [9, 10]. 
Social media also offers the opportunity of crowdsourcing 
information regarding either the causal event itself, or 
sentiment of passengers during the disruption [11] 
highlighting needs for intervention. 
 Automation plays a key role in many of these disruption 
management solutions. This may be in the form of full 
automation, such as automated route setting being able to 
seamlessly adapt to replanning on the part of signallers / 
dispatchers or partial automation and decision-support, for 
example by proposing crew and rolling stock schedules to 
enable alternative schedules.  
 The implementation of automation within train traffic 
management has however not been without problems. Lessons 
learned from the implementation of automatic route setting is 
that signallers / dispatchers must have a clear understanding of 
the proposed actions and rationale of the automation that 
allows them to interpret intended actions. Decisions made by 
the automation must be effective, with sufficient time for the 
signaller / dispatcher to intervene should the proposed action 
be sub-optimal. Where this has not been achieved, there is a 
reluctance of signaller / dispatchers to engage with the 
automation, even leading to turning the automation off 
altogether [12]. This can have a profound impact on the 
feasibility of operations in situations where workstation design 
and / or the timetable are predicated on the anticipated 
efficiencies afforded by functioning automation.  
The experience of automated route setting is not atypical. 
The introduction of automation in other transport settings, 
manufacturing, process control, healthcare and beyond is 
littered with similar experiences. Historically, attempts to 
integrate automation in many domains have taken a functional 
allocation approach [13]. One or more functional aspects of a 
process are identified as amenable to automation, and this 
aspect of the process is taken out of the control of the human 
and placed in the hands of some automated system. While this 
approach appears pragmatic, it can have significant negative 
repercussions for other tasks that remain within the remit of the 
human operator, for the maintenance of human skill, 
knowledge and motivation, and for the ability of humans to re-
establish effective control if the automation fails [14, 15]. 
These negative effects are felt most acutely when the 
automation is taking over a cognitive aspect of control, such as 
decision-making or planning. These effects include both  
1) decreased situation awareness for the operator who, 
without active involvement in the process, feels ‘out of the 
loop’ in both the status of the process, and the actions of the 
automation 
2) the automation only considering a subset of the tacit 
and contextual cues, or secondary planning considerations, that 
a human operator brings to the problem. As a result, the 
functionally limited scope of the automation leads to 
suboptimal solutions that a human operator must repair. The 
operator may be forced to turn off the automation altogether or, 
in the most extreme cases, may not realise that the automation 
is in a completely unanticipated state, with potentially fatal 
consequences. 
As we now turn the power of automation and intelligence 
to support those roles involved during disruption it is critical to 
ensure that new technologies are designed and embedded to 
avoid these problems. However, help is at hand in the form of 
human- and systems-centred principles for automation. Based 
on the experiences with signalling automation, Balfe et al [12] 
propose principles for the successful deployment of 
automation. While these principles are derived from signalling 
they are proposed as a general set of principles that can be used 
within transport automation. Additionally, Klein et al [16] 
identify 10 challenges for making automation a “team player”. 
These challenges can be reformulated as principles applied to 
the design of automated systems [17]. 
Therefore we have two potential sets of principles – one 
specific to transport, one generic, that can be used to inform the 
design of automated disruption management systems. The rest 
of this paper will review these principles in order to assess their 
relevance to disruption management tools. Section 2 presents 
further details on the two sets of principles. Section 3 presents 
more detailed background on the complexity of disruption 
management. Section 4 elaborates on the sets of the principles 
to meet the needs of disruption management. Section 5 
presents future directions.   
In order to set the scope of the rest of the paper, the focus is 
not only signaller / dispatchers but also those involved in 
higher-level re-planning functions. We follow the convention 
from Farrington-Darby et al [18] and GB rail operations by 
calling these more strategic disruption management roles 
‘controllers’, though we note that with the advent of 
sophisticated traffic management solutions, many signallers / 
dispatchers will start to take on at least some aspects of the 
controller function.  
II. GUIDELINES FOR AUTOMATION DEPLOYMENT 
It is a considerable challenge to develop and deploy 
automation support that can avoid general problems of human-
automation cooperation outlined in the introduction.  
However, there are frameworks and principles for the 
effective design of technology.  
The first of these is from Balfe et al [12]. Based on 
substantial observational and experimental work in the use of 
automated route setting (ARS), including analysis of both 
motivations for acceptance and rejection of automation by 
signaler / dispatchers, Balfe et al propose principles for the 
design of transport automation systems. The principles have 
emerged from consideration of   Signalers general opinions and attitudes toward ARS, 
their desire or reluctance to work with automation, 
and how they view it in terms of their role  System performance issues with the ARS – how 
effective is the ARS is being able to run the timetable 
as required; how is this impeded by, for example, 
having an accurate and feasible model of the timetable  Knowledge of ARS and expectations of behavior – 
signalers understanding of what ARS is doing and 
how it is arriving at the decisions it makes  Interaction with ARS, the need to intervene with the 
ARS, confidence in ARS and the responsibility of the 
ARS and signaler to regulate the trains. 
From these four general considerations, ten specific principles 
for the design of automation are proposed, presented in Table 
1. 
While these principles are specific to transport, the 
longstanding issues with successful deployment of automation 
have led to more general approaches and principles. Emerging 
from cognitive systems engineering, Klein et al. [6] argue that 
collaboration between human actors and agents should be 
based around more fundamental principles of collaboration. 
These requirements are  
1. The basic compact – This is the agreement, often 
tacit, between parties to work towards a common 
goal. This agreement also entails the 
understanding that this is a process that needs 
investment and ongoing maintenance to ensure 
that goals remain current, mutual and shared. 
Critically, parties may need to explicitly indicate 
when they are temporarily or permanently 
suspending their involvement in the compact.  
 
TABLE 1 – PRINCIPLES OF TRANSPORT AUTOMATION 
Principles of automation 
Reliable – Automation should function consistently 
Competent – Automation should perform correctly given the 
information that is input 
Visible – All decision-relevant information should be available 
Observable – Effective feedback to allow awareness of system state 
Understandable – The state of the automation and the world should 
be understandable given the current state of the environment 
Directable – It should be possible to direct the automation easily and 
efficiently 
Robust – The automation should perform effectively under a variety 
of conditions 
Accountable – The operator should be responsible for overall 
performance 
Proactive control – The automation should support the operator in 
predicting ahead 
Skill degradation – The automation should incorporate a method to 
protect against skill degradation 
2. Mutual predictability – Any party involved in a 
collaborative activity must be able to predict and influence the 
actions of others in the compact.  
3. Directability – A party must also be able to shape 
another party’s activity and requires the other party’s adequate 
responsiveness.  
4. Common ground – Common ground is shared beliefs, 
knowledge and awareness requisite to complete a task. As 
important as the common ground itself is the need for all 
parties to work to maintain that common ground by sharing 
information about overall task status, and their own status, or 
by acknowledging when a party’s knowledge may be 
incomplete.  
From these four principles for collaboration, Klein et al. 
argue that there are ten challenges to address when one or 
more of the team players in a collaborative control setting is 
an automated agent. These challenges are particularly acute 
when intelligence (i.e. decision making) might be distributed 
between human and non-human actors. The ten challenges are 
presented in Table 2. These challenges can serve as design 
principles that can inform human-automation deployment 
configurations, and have been used to specify requirements for 
agent design, HMI, context sensitive and competency in 
automated assembly [17].  
 
TABLE 2 – CHALLENGES FOR MAKING AUTOMATION A TEAM 
PLAYER 
Challenge 1: To be a team player, the agent must take part in the 
basic compact Automation must be able to say when it is able to 
engage in mutual activity. The human operator must be aware of 
when automation is no longer available to support goals.  
Challenge 2: Agents must model other actors’ intentions In the 
counterpart to Challenge 1, agents must also be able to understand 
the availability and intentions of other actors within the system.  
Challenge 3: Humans and agents must be mutually predictable 
The actions of agents must be predictable to human operators. This is 
a challenge when decision-making or action is emergent from a 
number of other processes or when algorithms are opaque to humans. 
Challenge 4: Directability Agents must be governed or directed in 
some manner, and having the means to do so effectively is critical to 
the success of human-automation collaboration. 
Challenge 5: Making status and intentions obvious One of the key 
difficulties typically encountered with automation is that the operator 
does not have an understanding of the plans or actions of the 
automation. Therefore, agents must make their intentions clear in a 
manner that matches the control responsibilities of the operator. 
Challenge 6: Agents must be able to observe and interpret other 
actors’ intentions Agents must be able to infer from signals the 
implications of other actors’ actions for overall collaborative control. 
In this sense, the agent has to, to a degree, model other actors.  
Challenge 7: Agents must engage in goal negotiation In order to 
maintain the compact, agents must communicate their goals and 
leave them amenable to adaptation by human users. Likewise they 
must be able to express their goals and communicate their priority 
should the human actor need to adapt their own goals in response. 
Challenge 8: Technologies for planning and autonomy must take 
a collaborative approach Plans are typically iterative and subject to 
change. Agents developing and executing plans must be open to 
renegotiation of resources in response to changing conditions. 
Challenge 9: Agents must participate in managing attention 
Automated agents should not just highlight when they are at the edge 
of performance, but also indicate when performance barriers are 
being reached or when system changes are about to take place. 
Challenge 10: All team members must help control the cost of 
collaborative activity Coordination has a cost, and agents should 
have a model of workload in order to anticipate and manage demands 
placed on the operator. Likewise, the human operator should have a 
model of the capabilities and limits of the automation. 
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF DISRUPTION MANAGEMENT 
Disruption management is linked to signaling / dispatching 
but also involves other functions and roles. To that end, the 
following section outlines the major characteristics of 
disruption management. These factors have been derived from 
literature, and specific investigations involving disruption 
analyses [19]  and expert knowledge elicitation [20] conducted 
as part of the On-time EU FP7 project to improve capacity.  
Transport disruption can be defined as an event that leads 
to significant re-planning of a transport service. Specifically, 
for this paper, the focus is on unplanned disruption, as 
opposed to planned engineering. Unexpected events such as 
train failures or overhead line dewirements, or widespread 
restrictions due to high-winds or flooding, are a daily 
occurrence on the railways. Events such as these may take 
hours to resolve, and cause significant delay and frustration to 
passengers and freight customers. While this paper focusses 
on the experience of the railways of Great Britain, such 
disruption is common to all forms of heavy and light railway, 
globally. 
Various approaches are proposed to support the 
management of incidents and disruption on the railways. One 
is to prevent disruptions, but it is not feasible, however, to 
anticipate all forms of potential failures or incidents. An 
alternative approach is therefore to manage and mitigate 
disruption more effectively as it occurs. Stages of the 
disruption include the notification and initial containment of 
an event, then coordinating and mobilising any trackside 
response such as maintenance staff or emergency services, re-
planning the service to maintain continuity during the event 
including informing passengers, restoration of infrastructure to 
service and, finally, return to normal [19]. All of this is 
conducted within the key performance criteria of safety, 
punctuality and cost effectiveness. 
Critically this process crosses functional and geographical 
boundaries, as the disruption will often involve the support of 
train or track maintenance or repair, signaling and dispatching, 
route replanning, and roles to coordinate information 
internally and to passengers. In Great Britain, this process is 
led by incident controllers who have central responsibility for 
coordinating response. These responsibilities include making 
operational decisions to manage the rectification of disruption 
and to organise and disseminate alternative service 
arrangements (further detail on the orchestration of incident 
control is presented in [18]). These decisions are acted upon, 
and informed by, signallers, train crew, station staff, 
maintenance staff and sometimes external parties such as the 
emergency services. Naturally, a major set of stakeholders in 
the disruption are the passengers themselves, delayed in trains 
or stations.  
Disruption is not, however, a unitary phenomenon. First, 
events such as infrastructure failure do not always lead to 
disruption and this can be down to the way the incident is 
managed, minimising or avoiding altogether any impact on 
timetabled services. Disruptions are dynamic, with different 
stages requiring different types of information and 
coordination amongst various stakeholders. For rail disruption, 
the opening stages, where the event is first noticed and 
immediate containment action is applied, may be brief (in the 
order of a few minutes) but critical if the situation is not to 
escalate [21]. However, tools such as crew and rolling stock 
rescheduling may only be relevant to a later phase of re-
planning to put alternative service plans in place. Also, 
railway disruptions do not always follow a single, linear 
process. Major incidents such as a break in the overhead 
electrification may take many hours to resolve. During the 
course of such incidents there may be many cycles of 
investigation, rectification and adaption of plans before 
normal service is restored [19]. Another consideration is that 
incidents vary – their causes, timing and location can all 
influence the choice of effective strategy [20].  For example, 
at the busiest times on the busiest parts of the network the 
most adaptive course of action may be to apply temporary 
(though safe) repairs to keep a partial service running, and 
complete the fix overnight when there are fewer train services.   
The handling of incidents involving the railways requires 
close coordination between many parties across different 
organisations, such as different train operating companies, 
some of whom have conflicting priorities [22].  For the most 
severe incidents and emergencies, these groups are rapidly 
configured between parties who do not regularly cooperate, 
such as the emergency service or air ambulance  and may 
often be physically distributed, communicating primarily 
through telephones. These types of incidents may draw on 
different skills and competence compared to ‘routine’ 
disruption. For example, even highly experienced control staff 
feel least confident when dealing with third party emergency 
services during incidents [23].  
In many settings the coordination of these plans is a 
manual activity through the telephone or face to face 
conversation. This means that a single, agreed plan is rarely 
communicated and understood by all parties. Instead, partial 
plans are communicated. This is exacerbated by few, if any, 
predictive tools, meaning that individuals extrapolate plans in 
to the future based on experience. A lack of a single picture of 
disruption is common [4]. 
One major drawback for potential disruption management 
tools is that each event is so specific and so linked to the 
particulars of the disruption event that is difficult to define 
generic solutions or algorithms [24]. Furthermore, there is a 
question of whether tools should be specific to disruption or of 
more general utility. One principle from the world of 
emergency response information systems is that technologies 
that are specific to emergencies, and are therefore unused the 
rest of the time, are unfamiliar and unused in the actual 
emergency [25] and there is some anecdotal evidence from 
rail to support this.  
In summary, there are some key challenges with meeting 
the needs of disruption support :- 
1. There is a fundamental need to minimize the impact of 
disruption both in geographical scope, and by limiting 
the time the disruption persists. 
2. There may be many different functions involved 
across different organisations with different views and 
priorities. 
3. There are challenges with giving all functions in the 
disruption management process a shared view of 
events – currently, much of this is conducted over the 
phone, and people develop their own plans. 
4. Each disruption event is different – different location, 
timing, causes and impact – and employing generic or 
flexibly re-usable solutions is difficult. 
5. Projection and prediction of the impact of an event is 
based on expertise and experience, and people have 
different levels of competence depending on the type 
of disruption. 
6. The event changes – new information comes to light, 
new priorities emerge and this means plans may have 
to change during the course of a disruption event. 
7. Technologies that are only used during disruption, or 
are only applicable to specific types of disruption run 
the risk of being disregarded. 
IV. APPLYING PRINCIPLES TO DISRUPTION MANAGEMENT 
It is possible to interpret the principles of Balfe et al and 
Klein within the requirements of rail disruption management 
tools. To that end, Table 3 takes the requirements and 
identifies specific principles that apply to each need.  
There are common themes across the table, and these 
highlight some factors for design and deployment that go 
beyond the basic effectiveness of the algorithms built for the 
purposes of the automation. 
Performance – Being able to define competent 
automation that meets the needs of the basic compact 
requires a clear understanding of the whole system 
performance targets. We would venture that an approach 
informed by cybernetics / Cognitive Systems Engineering  
[15] can be powerful in clarifying the true purpose and 
parameters of the joint cognitive system that is disruption 
management plus automation.  
Processes – A key requirement from the principles is the 
need for automation to be adaptable / for goals to be 
negotiable depending on the changing information during the 
process of disruption. An adequate model of the disruption 
process can give a clearer picture of what information is 
involved and when, depending on the type of disruption (see 
[20]). This is coupled with… 
Role mapping – The need to understand the types of 
users, their competencies and their functions, is critical to 
understanding roles and information needs. Moreover, the 
ideal automation will have some form of model, at least of 
the key roles, of its users. This can be achieved through 
effective mapping of roles, functions and their decisions. 
These functions, and their constraints, come in and out of 
play as the disruption proceeds, and therefore role modelling 
is allied with process modelling.  
Human-Machine Interface – All too often, HMI is 
simply treated as the question of how to present information. 
While this is critical, and should be sensitive to factors such 
as role, these principles also highlight the need to develop an 
effective interaction model. That is, what are the points of 
contact between the automation and the user that allow user 
inputs to be considered in the solution, not just once, but as 
the solution is evolving and adapting over the course of the 
disruption. It is only through the interaction model that 
qualities such as the ability to support goal negotiation 
(Klien et al’s challenges 7 and 8) can be achieved. 
Human Competency – While the emphasis of this paper 
has been on needs to design technology to bring it closer in 
line with the needs of users, the approach of Klien et al in 
particular highlights this is still a cooperative relationship. 
To that end, there are points at which developing operator 
competence will have benefits. This includes an 
understanding on the part of operators to know the feasible 
limits of, and expectations upon, the automation, and to find 
a deployment strategy whereby the automation is viewed as a 
team player with a specific function or functions within the 
overall system of disruption management, rather than a pure 
replacement for existing skills and knowledge within a 
disruption management team.  
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Infrastructure managers and the supply chain are turning to 
automation and decision-support as tools to help them manage 
disruption. Importantly, and encouragingly, the introduction of 
automation naturally affords two major benefits to the 
disruption management process rather in addition to using 
sophisticated algorithms to optimize performance. These are 
the ability to have a standardized prediction and, almost as an 
useful by product, the ability to communicate or share that 
predicted plan rapidly (via screens, rather than the phone) with 
relevant parties in the disruption process. However, design and 
introduction is not a trivial task. The challenges faced are to 
some extent similar to those faced in the deployment of 
automated route setting and dispatch automation, but are 
compounded by the very diverse nature of different 
disruptions [19, 20], the lack of shared predictive views [4] 
and the complexity of communications [18]. 
Analyses of these problems against principles for 
automation – both transport specific [12] and general [16] 
have highlighted the need to go beyond pure algorithm design 
to consider performance, roles and processes, HMI including 
interaction models, and competency as part of deployment 
strategy. Future work will involve drilling down into greater 
detail on these points to determine design and deployment 
strategy. To this end, current work is looking at more nuanced 
models of disruption events, elaborating in the work in [19] 
and [20], to understand the performance requirements of 
different disruptions, the communication flows involved 
(including to the passenger), and the timings associated with 
events such as full line blockages to develop a clearer 
teamworking model and ‘DNA’ for different types of 
disruption. 
TABLE 3 – MAPPING OF DISRUPTION MANAGEMENT AUTOMATION NEEDS TO PRINCIPLES FOR AUTOMATION DESIGN 
Requirement Transport automation principles Automation as a team player 
1. There is a fundamental need to 
minimize the impact of disruption both in 
geographical scope, and by limiting the 
time the disruption persists.  
Competency – technology needs to be able to support core 
tasks of disruption management 
Accountable – key roles are ultimately responsible for safety 
and performance during disruption. These roles should be the 
principle points of contact with the automation 
Challenge 1 – Automation must be available and 
appropriate to take part in the fundamental processes of 
disruption management. The limits of the scope of a 
technology must be clear and understood by all. 
2. There may be many different functions 
involved across different organisations 
with different views and priorities 
Visible- information needs to be presented according to 
decisions (identified in Golightly and Dadashi [20]) and 
tailored to roles 
Challenge 2 – Automation should have a model of the 
different functional roles that it is likely to work with, as 
this may affect the type of decisions needed and HMI.  
Challenge 3  The automation itself must be designed and 
deployed as a team player, with goals, responsibilities and 
boundaries understood by all. 
3. There are challenges with giving all 
functions in the disruption management 
process a shared view of events – currently, 
much of this is conducted over the phone, 
and people develop their own plans 
Observable – automation and associated HMI offers new 
opportunities for sharing information across the disruption 
management process. This should not only include the status 
of the automation but of the whole disruption state, including 
predictions.   
Challenge 5 – The outputs of automation can be (and 
should be) shared to all functions within the disruption 
management process. 
Challenge 10  Disruption management comes with other 
workload. The design of the automation must be sensitive 
to the costs of this work and the availability of roles for 
coordination. 
4. Each disruption event is different – 
different location, timing, causes and 
impact – and having generic or flexible re-
usable solutions is difficult, 
Robust – automation must be designed to reflect the variety 
of situations where disruption occurs, and variety of 
constraints 
Reliable – the automation should perform to a similar degree, 
and in a similar manner, across disruption settings 
Challenge 7 – Automation and actors must be able to 
clearly specify goals and parameters to match the specific 
nature of any given disruption.  
Challenge 1 – The automation should be able to indicate 
when it is not appropriate to the disruption scenario it is 
being faced with.  
5. Projection and prediction of the impact 
of an event is based on expertise and 
experience, and people have different 
levels of competence depending on the 
type of disruption, 
Proactive control – Automation should be predictive, 
providing views of not just current plans but future impact of 
plans. These plans may be contextualized for different roles 
(route control, rolling stock control, information control). 
Understandable – Different levels of competency are also 
likely to be reflected in different levels of knowledge in using 
the automation.  
Challenge 3 – Humans operators may need, to a degree, to 
upskill to match the competency required from the 
automation.  
Challenge 6 – Automation should have a model of 
functions and competence of other actors. 
6. The event changes – new information 
comes to light, new priorities emerge and 
this means plans may have to change 
during the course of a disruption event, 
Directable  The automation (and produced plans) must be 
amenable to change and adaptation during the course of a 
disruption as new information and priorities emerge 
Challenge 8 – Automation must be amenable to a change in 
plans and renegotiation of goals as the event progresses 
Challenge 9 – As targets change, automation and users 
together should be aware of when they are reaching the 
limits of performance. 
7. Technologies that are only used during 
disruption, or are only applicable to 
specific types of disruption run the risk of 
being disregarded. 
Skill degradation – Technologies that are amenable to a wide 
range of disruption or, indeed, have value in non-disruption 
situations, are more likely to be understood and used than 
ones relevant to specific situations.  
Challenge 8 – The ideal automation is embedded and 
flexible to all operations, not just disruption. 
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